We systematically reviewed the statistical disclosure control techniques employed for releasing aggregate data in Webbased data query systems listed in the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS). Each Web-based data query system was examined to see whether (1) it employed any type of cell suppression, (2) it used secondary cell suppression, and (3) suppressed cell counts could be calculated. No more than 30 minutes was spent on each system. Of the 35 systems reviewed, no suppression was observed in more than half (n = 18); observed counts below the threshold were observed in 2 sites; and suppressed values were recoverable in 9 sites. Six sites effectively suppressed small counts. This inquiry has revealed substantial weaknesses in the protective measures used in data query systems containing sensitive public health data. Many systems utilized no disclosure control whatsoever, and the vast majority of those that did deployed it inconsistently or inadequately.
I
nteractive Web-based data query systems (WDQS) are commonly used by state public health authorities to provide vital statistics and health surveillance data for use by researchers and policy makers. According to a recent survey of state coordinators for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), a majority of US states currently host public health-relevant data query systems. 1 Such systems typically provide aggregate information to users in response to predefined, and in some cases customized, queries. Although query results are deidentified and presented only in aggregate form, care must be taken to prevent individuals from being reidentified. Reidentification may occur when individuals have rare conditions, attributes, or configurations of attributes or when ancillary information, such as publicly available voter lists or death registries, can be linked to files containing sensitive information. Best practices for statistical disclosure control are well established and widely referenced. [2] [3] [4] [5] Typically, privacy protection is accomplished using primary and secondary, or complementary, suppression strategies, where data that do not meet certain quantitative thresholds (eg, cell sizes < 5, or marginal totals from which small cell counts can be derived) are suppressed. 6 (Primary suppression is the direct suppression of cells with small counts, whereas secondary suppression suppresses additional cells that do not have small counts themselves but that need to be suppressed to protect the values in the primarily suppressed cells.)
Despite the well-established guidelines for privacy protection and statistical disclosure control related to WDQS, 2 there has not been a systematic review of what public health data systems are currently doing to protect the privacy of individuals whose information they maintain, nor has the adequacy of the privacy protections adopted in these systems been examined. In this brief, we present an overview of the privacy protections used by public health WDQS. We focus on 3 related questions: (1) What approaches to privacy protection have states taken in presenting health data through WDQS? (2) How well do these systems adhere to the strategies they have selected? (3) Are states' approaches to privacy protection for WDQS adequate?
Methods
We reviewed 35 state-affiliated, public healthrelevant WDQS included in the inventory presented by the National Association of Public Health Information Systems (NAPHSIS). 7 The statistics disclosure control techniques employed by all systems that allowed flexible generation of tabular results were documented. Following determination of the types of statistical disclosure methods employed by each site, a maximum of 30 minutes of examination per site was allowed to search for flaws in the implementation of disclosure control practices. Examples of flaws in the implementation disclosure control would include observing cell counts below the stated suppression threshold, the ability to recover suppressed values using observed marginal totals, and disclosure by differencing using multiple queries 8 
For each query system, we attempted to answer the following questions and documented results with screenshots of the query results when a problem was identified:
• Does this site employ cell suppression of any kind, and what is the threshold for suppression? • If a site is employing primary cell suppression, is it also employing complementary cell suppression? • If a site is employing primary cell suppression, can disclosure by differencing be employed to calculate the true value of a suppressed cell?
Results
Our summary of the statistical disclosure control practices employed by WDQS is presented in the Table. Whether and how each system addressed disclosure concerns varied considerably. Of the 35 systems evaluated, 18 made no effort to incorporate disclosure control techniques. Among those that claimed to incorporate such strategies, some form of suppression was most commonly employed, although the standards used-minimum cell size tolerated, whether both primary and secondary cell suppression strategies were attempted-varied dramatically. Two systems used primary suppression thresholds that were less stringent than those advocated in prominent guidelines 2 (ie, < 5). In 9 systems, suppressed cells were recoverable, either by examining marginal totals for rows or columns with suppressed cells or by "differencing" results obtained from multiple queries. In only 6 of the 35 systems reviewed were no suppression errors or flaws observed.
Discussion
This inquiry has revealed substantial weaknesses in the privacy protection measures used in stateauthorized WDQS containing sensitive health and public health data. Many systems utilize no disclosure control whatsoever, and the vast majority of those that do deploy it inconsistently or inadequately, failing to meet the standards promulgated in the
Implications for Policy & Practice
■ This article demonstrates that many states are not adequately protecting tabular data releases from statistical disclosure. The primary method used to control disclosure was found to be suppression. However, while suppression does offer increased protection against disclosure, in many cases it does not go far enough.
■ It is our hope that states that are releasing data in this format will reassess their statistical disclosure limitation policies so as to better conform to national and international guidelines set forth by organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the European Statistical System.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's DIS-CLOSURE MANUAL. 6 Consequently, information from individuals whose attributes make them "outliers" is freely available; our review found that this includes highly sensitive information such as causes of death due to HIV infection or suicide. In some cases, this resulted in the ability to recreate personor record-level data, which carry far greater disclosure risks than aggregate data and should not be publicly available without a data use agreement and formal human subjects' review. None of the systems reviewed in this study required a human subjects' review or completion of a data use agreement to access data.
Results from a recent survey of state BRFSS coordinators 1 suggest that the risks associated with the disclosure control practices used in WDQS are not appreciated. BRFSS coordinators whose states had deployed a query system reported that privacy protection was one of the least challenging aspects to presenting health data over the Internet, falling well below such concerns as the cost of hardware and software and a lack of internal information technology support. We hope that the results of our analysis will prompt states to reexamine their approaches to privacy protection and statistical disclosure control in their public health data systems.
Public Health Implications
Access to population-level health data is essential to public health planning and surveillance efforts. Although the aggregate data presented in state health and public health-related WDQS support these critical public health activities, the inadequacy of safeguards to prevent reidentification of ostensibly deidentified data presents serious risks to personal privacy and jeopardizes public support for such data access systems.
